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Abstract
Recent studies suggest psychological differences between conservatives and liberals,
including that conservatives are more overconfident. We use a behavioral political
economy model to show that while this is undoubtedly true for election years in the
current era, there is no reason to believe that conservative ideologies are intrinsically
linked to overconfidence. Indeed, it appears that in 1980 and before, conservatives and
liberals were equally overconfident.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there have been a number of scholarly articles written with the premise
that there is something fundamentally different about conservatives and conservative beliefs.
Alford, Funk and Hibbing (2005) shows that there are genetic differences between liberals
and conservatives. Oxley et al. (2008) shows that conservatives are more responsive to
threatening stimuli. Jost et al. (2003) finds that conservatives are less prone to enduring
uncertainty. This lead Moore and Healy (2007) to speculate, and find, that conservatives
were, in their study, more overconfident.
Our own recent work seems to add to this general trend, finding that conservatives are
more overconfident in a large, representative U.S. survey (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015).
However, our work differs in a fundamental way from the work described above: the findings
are based on a formal model of beliefs. In our model, the relationship between overconfidence
and conservatism comes from a single parameter, x, that captures the average signal received
by the members of the society in a given period, and specifically, from the fact that in our
dataset x > 0. But there is nothing in the model that says that this parameter has to be
greater than zero. In fact, in other times and places it could be equal to zero, or less than
zero, or vary over time, leading to much different results.
In this paper we generalize the model of Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) to allow this
parameter to vary over time, and investigate the implications of that generalization for the
relationship between overconfidence and ideology (in Sections 2 and 4). This generalization
introduces the concept of a political zeitgeist—a prevailing set of political beliefs in a period
that shape people who live through that period.1
After the theoretical analysis, we turn to examine the predictions in data from a rep-
resentative survey of the U.S. in 2011 (in Sections 3 and 5). This analysis benefits from
the presence of two measures of overconfidence that we can use to eliminate biases due to
measurement error. We find that, contrary to the analysis of similar data in 2010, there is no
1Zeitgeist is an English loan word from German, which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as, “The
defining spirit or mood of a particular period of history as shown by the ideas and beliefs of the time.”
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relationship between overconfidence and conservatism. From this, we conclude that x = 0
in 2011, and show that other predictions of the model that depend on x have changed in
accordance with the change in x. That is, despite the change in the value of x, the theory
continues to provide an accurate description of the data.
We then take advantage of the fact that our extended model allows x to change over
time—that is, there is a time dependent x, given by xt, when examining the relationship
between age, media exposure, and overconfidence in Section 6. Here, we find support for
the more nuanced predictions of the theory. In particular, our analysis of media exposure
once again is compatible with the conclusion that xt = 0 in our data. However, the patterns
associated with age and ideology suggest that the residual effects of xt−1 > 0, xt−2 > 0, . . .
in many previous years are still influencing older U.S. citizens today.
Our final set of analyses tries to confirm this using data from the American National
Election Study’s cumulative data file. This data contains many similar surveys going back
over 50 years. However, we are hampered by the fact that key variables we wish to analyze—
ideology, media exposure, and overconfidence—are not consistently measured (or measured
at all) during that entire time period. Still, we find evidence consistent with x > 0 in election
years from 1982–2008. However, before 1980, it appears that x = 0 (or very close to it).
Bringing these results together, it appears that there is no intrinsic relationship between
overconfidence and conservatism, yet our theory is still consistent with the data we have
analyzed. In particular, there is little doubt that conservatives were more overconfident
in 2010, the year of our previous study. Moreover, this is likely to have been the case in
election years since 1980. However, before 1980, and in non-election years (when surveys are
rarely run), conservatives and liberals appear to be equally overconfident. These results are
consistent with our (fully formalized) theory, and provides a deeper understanding of political
belief formation: it appears that these differences can be rationalized by the existence of
different political zeitgeists that shape people’s political beliefs over the course of their lives.
More generally, this suggests that in order to truly understand the links between different
behavioral economic traits and biases and political attributes, it is necessary to build and
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test models which specify where these links come from. Failing to do so creates confusion
when “things change”, as they inevitably do. For example, Foley (2013) tries to replicate
the study of Oxley et al. (2008), referenced above, and finds the opposite result: namely,
that liberals are more sensitive to threatening stimuli. Because there is no formal theory
underlying these results, there is no way to tell if the difference comes from a change in
the conception of ideology, a change in the set of stimuli people are concerned about, or a
change in the relationship between threatening stimuli and ideology, or more than one of
these factors.
2 Theoretical Framework
The basic structure of the theory follows Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) with one important
difference: we allow for shocks to the state variable. This allows us to examine time varia-
tion in preferences and overconfidence, giving a crisper picture of the relationship between
overconfidence and left-right ideology.2
For modeling purposes, we consider “today” to be period T . There is a unit measure of
citizens i ∈ [0, 1], each with age ti ∼ Ft with support {1, 2, 3, . . . , T}. Each citizen i has a
utility over political actions that depends on a state of the world. A citizen’s belief about
the state are determined by her experiences, and her ideology reflects these beliefs.
Utilities: Each citizen i has a standard quadratic-loss utility over actions ai ∈ R, which
depends on a state x ∈ R
U(ai|x) = −(ai − x)2.
Throughout, ai is the policy implemented by government.
3 The state x is a single draw from
N [0, τ ] where τ is the precision of the normal distribution.4 Importantly, x does not change
2Another difference from Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) is that we omit preferences from ideology—that
is, we have a common-value environment. All results would remain the same if we included preferences as
well, but it would complicate the analysis without producing additional, testable results.
3To add preference biases, we could model U(ai, bi|x) = −(ai − pi − x)2, where pi ∼ N [0, τp].
4The precision is the inverse of the variance.
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over time, but aggregate beliefs about it may, as we detail below.
With uncertainty about the state, it is straightforward to show that the policy preferred
by citizen i will be a∗i = Ei[x], where Ei is the expectation taken over citizen i’s beliefs. We
define this quantity as the citizen’s ideology,
Ii ≡ Ei[x], (1)
and, as the expectation of x is zero, ideological extremeness as Ei = |Ii|.
Experiences, Beliefs, and Correlational Neglect: The core of the model is the process
by which citizens form beliefs about the state. Each citizen is well-calibrated about the
informativeness of each individual experience (signal), but underestimates the correlation
between signals.
Citizen i has been alive for ti ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , T} periods, which implies he was born in
period bi ≡ T − ti. In each period a citizen i is alive he receives ni signals. Citizen i’s, jth
experience in period t is determined by:
eijt = x+ ηt + εijt
where ηt is an i.i.d. draw, once per period for the entire population, according to a N [0, τη]
mean-zero normal distribution with precision τη. The random variable ηt is the formal
expression of a political zeitgeist as defined in Section 1—a prevailing set of political beliefs,
in a period, that shape people who live through that period.
The presence of a zeitgeist is the major departure from our previous work. It means that
there is “effectively” a new state xt ≡ x + ηt in each period, and that for citizens born in
period t, all of their experiences will be centered around this state. However, as citizens
age, their beliefs about x will be determined by the sequence of zeitgeists the citizen lives
through.5
5The fact that zeitgeists are independent draws means that they will be uncorrelated across time. This is
a happy medium between two contrasting perspectives: one that expects political culture to change slowly
over time (implying a positive correlation), and another that sees current political attitudes as a reaction
to past political attitudes (implying a negative correlation). Allowing for correlation between zeitgeists
significantly complicates the analysis, however, all of our results should hold for relatively small correlations.
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Everything up until this point is common knowledge. Individual heterogeneity enters
through the εijt ∼ N [0, 1], and through differences in citizens’ beliefs about the process gen-
erating that random variable. In particular, the εijt drawn for a given citizen are correlated
with each other (but not correlated with the εijt of other citizens), with Corr[εijt, εij′t′ ] = ρ.
However, citizen i underestimates this correlation: he believes Corr[εijt, εij′t′ ] = ρi ∈ [0, ρ).6
Definition. A citizen suffers from correlational neglect when ρi < ρ.
The magnitude of correlational neglect varies by citizen, and is an i.i.d. draw from Fρi with
support [0, ρ), and ρi⊥ei. As ρi < ρ for all i, all citizens in our model are correlational
neglecters.
Overconfidence: As our data measures overconfidence, our theoretical results are in terms
of this variable. Denote the precision of citizen i’s posterior belief as κi + τ , which we refer
to as the citizen’s confidence. Additionally, denote by κ + τ the posterior belief the citizen
would have if she had accurate beliefs about the correlation between signals.
Definition. Overconfidence is the difference between a citizen’s confidence, and how con-
fident she would be if she were properly calibrated, κi−κ. Given two citizens i and j, we say
that i is more overconfident than j if κi ≥ κj > 0.
We often refer to κi as a citizen’s level of overconfidence.
3 Data
The data which we focus on for much of our paper comes from the Caltech module and the
common content of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) (Alvarez, 2011;
We leave a full treatment of this question to future research.
6Formally, εi is distributed according to a mean-zero multinomial normal with covariance matrix
Σεi =

1 ρ · · · ρ
ρ 1 · · · ρ
...
...
. . .
...
ρ ρ · · · 1
 . However, citizen i believes that Σεi =

1 ρi · · · ρi
ρi 1 · · · ρi
...
...
. . .
...
ρi ρi · · · 1
 .
Each εijt has unit variance, so Corr[εijt, εij′t′ ] = Cov[εijt, εij′t′ ] = ρ. We also assume that η⊥εi.
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Ansolabehere, 2011). The data in Section 7 comes from the American National Election
Survey cumulative data file. As the ANES is relatively well known, we focus in this section
on the CCES data, and describe any necessary details about the ANES data in Section 7.
As noted in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), the CCES is an annual cooperative survey.
Participating institutions purchase a module of at least 1,000 respondents, who are asked
10–15 minutes of customized questions. In addition, every respondent across all modules
is asked the same battery of basic economic and political questions. The complete survey
is administered online by Knowledge Networks. Each module uses a matched-random sam-
pling technique to achieve a representative sample, with over-sampling of certain groups
(Ansolabehere, 2012; Ansolabehere and Rivers, 2013). For empirical specifications which
involve overconfidence, we use the Caltech module of 1,000 respondents. When a measure of
overconfidence is not needed, we can use the entire CCES, which contains 20,150 respondents.
3.1 Ideology and Extremeness
The predictions in this paper are mostly concerned with ideological extremeness, but in some
cases left-right ideology will be an important left-hand-side variable. Both are constructed
using the same process.
The CCES twice asks respondents to report their ideology: from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative. The first elicitation is when the respondent agrees to participate in
surveys (on a five point scale), and the second when taking the survey (on a seven point
scale). We normalize each of these measures to the interval [−1, 1], and average them. Those
that report they “don’t know” are treated as moderates (0).7
This measure of ideology is then folded around the median ideology, which happens to
be exactly zero (moderate).
7This is exactly the preferred self-reported ideology measure in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2013).
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3.2 Overconfidence
The most important feature of this data, for our purposes, is that it allows for a measure of
overconfidence. This measure is constructed in the same way as in Ortoleva and Snowberg
(2015): from four questions about respondent confidence in their guesses about four factual
quantities. This level of confidence is adjusted for a respondent’s accuracy on the factual
question, leaving the respondent’s overconfidence. This is similar to the standard psychology
measure in that it elicits confidence and controls for knowledge. However, it differs in that we
cannot say for certain whether a given respondent is overconfident, just that their confidence,
conditional on knowledge, is higher or lower than another respondent. Therefore, we use
previous research, which shows that (almost) everyone exhibits over-precision (almost) all
the time (Moore and Healy, 2007, 2008), to argue that this is a measure of overconfidence.
While the factual and confidence questions in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), which come
from the 2010 CCES, were asked as part of another set of studies (Ansolabehere, Meredith
and Snowberg, 2013, 2014), the 2011 CCES also contains our own battery of questions
to generate a second measure of overconfidence. That is, in 2011, like 2010, respondents
were asked their assessment of the current unemployment and inflation rates, and what the
unemployment and inflation rates would be a year from the date of the survey. Respondents
were then asked their confidence about their answer to each question on a qualitative, six-
point scale. The same questions were used to construct the measure in much of Ortoleva
and Snowberg (2015).
The 2011 CCES had additional questions which allowed us to calculate a second measure
of overconfidence on “general knowledge” questions. In particular, respondents were asked
about the year of the telephone’s invention, the year of Shakespeare’s birth, the percent of
the U.S. population living in California, and the population of Spain (in millions). After each
of these factual questions, respondents were asked what the percent chance was that their
answer was within a certain interval of the correct answer. For example, each respondent was
asked for the percent chance, from 0–100, that their answer for the year of the telephone’s
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invention was within 25 years of the correct answer.8
Confidence, κi reflects both knowledge and overconfidence, so subtracting knowledge from
confidence leaves overconfidence, κi − κ.9 As in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), to subtract
knowledge, we deduct points from a respondent’s reported confidence based on his or her
accuracy, and thus knowledge, on the corresponding factual question. This is implemented
conservatively: we regress confidence on an arbitrary, fourth-order polynomial of accuracy,
and use the residual as a measure of overconfidence. This allows the regression to pick the
points to deduct for each level of accuracy, such that knowledge absorbs as much variation
as possible.
Each of the resultant overconfidence measures are measured with error, as some respon-
dents with little knowledge will randomly provide accurate answers. Thus, we use the first
principal component of the four measures.10 Finally, to standardize regression coefficients,
we divide by the standard deviation.
Table 1 shows that both measures are correlated with self-reported ideological extreme-
ness, in keeping with the main prediction, and Table 9, of Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015).
Moreover, the correlations between the two measures and extremeness are statistically identi-
cal, despite the fact that the correlation between the two measures is only 0.35. We maintain
the same general form of the specifications by clustering standard errors by age when ap-
propriate, and estimate specifications using WLS and the supplied CCES sample weights
(Ansolabehere, 2012).
The final two columns examine the results of instrumenting the overconfidence measure in
our previous work (based on questions about the economy) with the overconfidence measure
8Thus, we followed the standard practice in psychology of asking about confidence intervals, but our
elicitation process would require us to invert these answers assuming a two parameter distribution—like the
normal—to establish the confidence interval. The intervals in the questions were chosen by piloting our
questions on Mechanical Turk, and then selecting an interval that was approximately one standard deviation
of the answers given there. For more on using Mechanical Turk in survey research, see Berinsky, Huber and
Lenz (2012).
9Theoretically, we need to control for the precision a citizen would have if they were properly calibrated.
As we do not observe this, we control for accuracy, which is, in our theory, correlated.
10Consistent with each measure consisting of an underlying dimension plus i.i.d. measurement error, the
first principal component weights each of the four questions approximately equally.
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Table 1: The relationship between overconfidence and extremeness is stronger when account-
ing for measurement error.
Dependent Variable: Ideological Extremeness
Overconfidence 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(Economy) (.047) (.040)
Overconfidence 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(General Knowledge) (.043) (.050)
Overconfidence 0.49∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(Instrumented) (.15) (.15)
Economic Controls Y Y Y
Number of Signals Y Y Y
R2 0.024 0.32 0.030 0.32 0.030 0.32
N 989
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors,
clustered by age (69 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with CCES
sampling weights.
derived from general knowledge questions. This, again, produces results consistent with
there being measurement error in our measure of overconfidence: the coefficient triples in
the IV regressions.11 This implies that the relationships in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015)
are severely underestimating the importance of overconfidence in political beliefs. Given the
importance of measurement error to our previous results, we will use IV specifications when
estimating the effects of overconfidence.
3.3 Number of Signals
The model in Section 2 allows for more nuanced predictions about the role of signals in
ideology and extremeness. Age—calculated as 2011 minus the year of a respondent’s birth—
is the most natural proxy for ti the number of periods a citizen (respondent) has been alive.
We proxy for ni, the number of signals a citizen receives in a given period, by his media
exposure. The CCES contains four questions that ask whether or not a respondent received
news from a specific media channel: blogs, TV, radio, or newspapers. We take the first
11Note that IV here is used to eliminate the attenuation bias associated with measurement error, not to
make claims about causality. For other prominent papers that use this approach to reducing attenuation
bias, see Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994); Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999).
9
principal component of these four yes/no questions to create a more continuous index of
media exposure. This principal component also de-emphasizes TV, as nearly all respondents
report getting political information from this channel.
3.4 Other Controls
Political economy theories generally view ideology as a function of wealth or income. There-
fore, we include controls for all the wealth and income related variables in the CCES. The
CCES provides these controls as categories: for example, rather than providing years of
education, it groups education into categories such as “Finished High School”. Thus, we
introduce a dummy variable for each category of each economic control. We also include a
category for missing data for each variable. These controls are: income (18 categories), ed-
ucation (6 categories), stock ownership (3 categories), home ownership (3 categories), union
/ union member in household (8 categories), state (51 categories, including DC). These are
the same controls used in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015).
All controls are entered categorically. This strategy is both too conservative and not
conservative enough: not conservative enough because there are likely other relevant un-
observed factors, and too conservative, as entering these variables categorically allows the
implied control function to be non-monotonic, as opposed to the theoretical monotonic rela-
tionship. Media and age are sometimes used as controls, rather than independent variables
of interest. There are 16 categories of media exposure. For age, there are 69 categories
(years) when using the Caltech module, and 77 categories when using the entire CCES.
4 Theoretical Analysis
This section shows how to map the more complicated model above—in which citizens receive
multiple signals with a complex correlational structure—into a simpler model where each
citizen receives only a single signal. In addition to making the model much more intuitive,
this mapping also allows us to directly apply many of the results from our previous work.
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Consider a model in which, as before, citizens have the same prior over x ∼ N [0, τ ].
However, now they only receive a single signal distributed ei ∼ N [x, κ] , ∀i, but citizens
overestimate the precision of this signal: that is, they believe that ei ∼ N [x, κi] , where
κi ≥ κ. If we properly define ei, κ and κi, then this “model” will give the same results.
Proposition 1.
Define ei ≡ 1
tini
T∑
t=bi
ni∑
j=1
eijt. Then κ =
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρ , and κi =
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρi .
Proof. All proofs can be found in the Appendix. 
This equivalence between models simplifies the analysis in a number of ways. First, note
that a citizen’s posterior beliefs will be distributed according to a N
[
κiei
κi+τ
, κi + τ
]
. In this
formulation, it is apparent that both extremity of beliefs—the term that multiplies ei—is
increasing in overconfidence, κi. This is the main result in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015),
which is shown in Table 1.
More importantly for the purposes of this paper are the insights that can be gained by
examining ei. Recalling that xt = x+ ηt, note that
E[ei] = x+
1
ti
T∑
t=bi
ηt =
1
ti
T∑
t=bi
xt ≡ xt.
That is, xt—the average belief about x in the population of citizens of age t—will depend
both on x and the various zeitgeists through which those citizens have lived. Moreover,
because one additional signal will move the average belief much less when a citizen has
observed many signals than when they have viewed very few, older citizens’ beliefs, and
thus ideology, should be much more stable than younger citizens. Both of these observations
comport well with general stylized facts about ideology over one’s lifetime (see, for example,
Ghitza and Gelman, 2014).
In addition, our structured model allows us to make further, more nuanced, predictions
that we can then analyze.
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Proposition 2.
1. Ideology is increasing in overconfidence, dE[Ii|κi−κ]
d(κi−κ) > 0, if and only if x > 0, and
decreasing in overconfidence iff x < 0.
2. If x > 0 then Cov[E , κi|Ii ≥ 0] > Cov[E , κi|Ii ≤ 0]. If x = 0 then Cov[E , κi|Ii ≥ 0] =
Cov[E , κi|Ii ≤ 0].
Proposition 3.
1. Overconfidence, κi, is increasing in media exposure ni and age ti.
2. The mean ideology in the population, conditional on n, E[Ii|(ti, ni)], is increasing in
(ti, ni) if and only if x > 0, and decreasing in (ti, ni) iff x < 0.
3. If x > 0 then Cov[E , (ti, ni)|Ii ≥ 0] > Cov[E , (ti, ni)|Ii ≤ 0]. If x = 0 then Cov[E , (ti, ni)|Ii ≥
0] = Cov[E , (ti, ni)|Ii ≤ 0].
These propositions come from Propositions 1, 4, 5, and 6 of Ortoleva and Snowberg
(2015), and can be applied directly with a small, additional, assumption: τη needs to be
small enough that increases in the variance of ideology as people age will swamp changes in
the zeitgeist.12 However, note that both of the above propositions depend on x, not xt. This
choice is for generality. In particular, xt will change over time, and will impact differently
people of different ages. The propositions will continue to hold even with a distribution of
ages (and thus, xts) in the population as long as τη is small enough, and more subtle analyses
are possible by allowing xt to change. We will note these in the text as we analyze the data
in the next two sections.
5 Empirical Analysis: Overconfidence
With the theoretical structure in place, we can examine the propositions above in data. We
start by examining Proposition 2 on the subset of the 2011 CCES data for which we have
overconfidence measures. The first column of Table 2 shows that, according to the first
part of Proposition 2, x = 0. More prosaically, it shows that contrary to the analysis of
12The case when x = 0 is not discussed in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), and, as such, is proved in the
Appendix.
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Table 2: Patterns in overconfidence and ideology are consistent with theory, inconsistent
with previous work.
Dep. Variable Ideology Extremeness Ideology Extremeness
Sample
Left of Right of Left of Right of
Median Median Median Median
Overconfidence 0.054 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ -0.0095 0.47∗∗ 0.30∗
(Instrumented) (.11) (.17) (.16) (.12) (.19) (.18)
Difference 0.050 0.17
(.23) (.26)
Economic Controls Y Y Y
Media Y Y Y
Age Y Y Y
R2 0.098 0.29
N 989 572 669 989 572 669
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors,
clustered by age (69 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with CCES
sampling weights. Sample sizes for left and right add to more than the total sample as the median
ideology (0) is included in both comparisons.
2010 survey data conducted in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) conservatives are not more
overconfident than liberals. The additional prediction in Proposition 2—that the covariance
between extremeness and overconfidence to the left and to the right of center should be the
same as x = 0—is consistent with the data.
A natural question is how can these results be compatible with the findings in our previous
work? This can occur from the presence of the zeitgeist, which influences aggregate signals
received by the society, and thus the difference between left and right. However, one might
note that the standard errors in this table are quite large, especially when controls are
added. As such, there may be some question as to whether the results are different, or
whether they just appear different due to insufficient sample size. Therefore we turn to
empirical predictions where we can lean on a much larger dataset: those predictions having
to do with the number of signals a citizen receives.
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Table 3: Overconfidence is positively correlated with media exposure and age.
Dependent Variable: Media Age Media Age
Overconfidence 0.42∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(Instrumented) (.092) (.10) (.10) (.11)
Economic Controls Y Y
R2 0.28 0.20
N 989
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
with standard errors in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS
with CCES sampling weights.
6 Empirical Analysis: Signals
The first result regarding the number of signals, the first part of Proposition 3, is a bridge
between overconfidence and the number of signals: it says that overconfidence is increasing
in the number of signals. We test this proposition in Table 3. In order to use the instru-
mented measure of overconfidence, we enter overconfidence as the dependent variable in the
regressions. While this may seem odd, as all the proposition predicts is a positive correlation,
it is a perfectly legitimate way to look for such a correlation.13 The results here confirm the
prediction, older citizens, and those with greater media exposure, are more overconfident.
We now move to examine the second and third parts of Proposition 3 using ni, media
exposure. The patterns here are the same as with overconfidence, except much more precise.
In particular, x is now a precisely estimated zero, and the difference between the covariances
with extremeness to the right and to the left is extremely small.
The results for age upend things a bit: based on the regression of ideology on age, it
would appear that x > 0. However, this would be inconsistent with the result above for
media exposure, where we found that x = 0. How can the two be reconciled? The answer is
subtle, and relies on the fact that age not only gives a citizen more signals, but also increases
the number of periods, and thus zeitgeists, that a citizen lives through. Formally, recall that
xt = x +
1
ti
∑T
t=bi
ηt, so xt could be, on average, increasing with age. On the other hand,
13This can be shown formally using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem.
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Table 4: Patterns in overconfidence and the number of signals make for a subtle application
of the theory.
Dep. Variable Ideology Extremeness Ideology Extremeness
Sample
Left of Right of Left of Right of
Median Median Median Median
Media Index -0.010 0.12∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(Standardized) (.11) (.011) (.014)
Age 0.088∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(Standardized) (.012) (.013) (.016)
Difference 0.018 0.11∗∗∗
(.017) (.020)
Economic Controls Y Y Y
Media Controls Y Y Y
Age Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.069 0.075
N 20,083 11,239 13,578 20,083 11,239 13,578
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors,
clustered by age (77 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with CCES
sampling weights. Sample sizes for left and right add to more than the total sample as the median
ideology (0) is included in both comparisons.
because a given level of media exposure will have people from all age groups in it, the average
E[xt|n] can be zero everywhere.14
We can attempt to “back-out” the level of these xts by examining people of different
ages, and how their ideology changes with signals. To do so, we divide our data into four
quartiles by age. Examining how ideology changes with media exposure for the youngest
quartile will give a clean measure of xt for the current era, but backing out the full sequence
of xt over time will be more difficult as it is not clear how to relatively weight the signals
received from aging versus media exposure.15
Taking these caveats into account, the results in Table 5 are somewhat consistent with the
patterns described above: xt seems to be negative today, but in the past was likely positive.
14Note that we also control for age in the regressions where media is the independent variable of interest,
although these controls have little effect on the results.
15Moreover, the distinction between age quartiles is done based on the dataset, and does not try to match
the cutoffs between these groups to other signs of a shift in the political zeitgeist.
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Table 5: Analysis by quartile allows for some inferences about xt over time.
Dependent Variable: Ideology
Quartile of Age: Youngest 2nd Youngest 2nd Oldest Oldest
Media -0.076∗∗∗ 0.017 0.012 0.024∗
(.017) (.019) (.013) (.014)
Economic Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.085 0.073 0.065 0.068
Age -0.018 0.33∗∗∗ -0.022 0.17∗∗∗
(.084) (.074) (.049) (.032)
Economic Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.079 0.078 0.065 0.072
N 3,412 3,338 7,440 5,893
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% with standard
errors in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with CCES sampling
weights. Unequal quartile sizes come from the use of sampling weights.
This is especially true for the oldest quartile of respondents, whose past experience must be
sufficiently positive to outweigh the negative xt in the current period. What is clearer is that
xt is increasing, and on average positive, when considering age.
7 Empirical Analysis: Historical Data
The final analysis we consider combines those in Section 5 and Section 6 by examining
the patterns of overconfidence in historical data. As the data we have examined to this
point are the only we are aware of that provide both good measures of political ideology
and of overconfidence, we turn to a survey with greater coverage over time, but more limited
measures of ideology and media exposure, and only a proxy for overconfidence: the American
National Election Study (ANES). This survey is conducted in every U.S. Congressional or
Presidential election year, that is, in every even-numbered year.
In particular, we follow a strategy based on the fact that many studies over time have
found men to be more overconfident than women and use male as a proxy for “more over-
16
Figure 1: Men became significantly more conservative after 1980.
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confident”.16 For ideology we use two measures. The first is a self-reported ideology measure
similar to that used in previous sections. The second asks respondents to give their impres-
sion of liberal and conservative ideologies on a “feelings thermometer” that goes from 0 to
100 (with 0 being “cold” or disagreement, and 100 indicating “hot” or complete agreement).
The difference between these two feelings thermometers can be interpreted as a measure
of ideology, and indeed, many studies do so (see, for example, Green, 1988, and citations
therein).
We investigate if there is variation over time in the difference between the average ideology
of men and women. Figure 1 plots the difference between men and women on both of these
16For example, Barber and Odean (2001) uses male as an instrument for overconfidence in a study of
financial risk taking.
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scales over time with 95% confidence intervals in each year we have data. There is a clear
rightward shift for men between 1980 and 1982. We divide the sample into two parts around
1981, and, in Table 6, we conduct a similar analysis to the one in Table 2.
Table 6: Data from the ANES is broadly consistent with Proposition 2.
Time Frame Up to 1980 1982 and After
Dep. Variable Ideology Extremeness Ideology Extremeness
Sample
Left of Right of Left of Right of
Median Median Median Median
Panel A: Self-Reported Ideology
Male 0.013 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(.032) (.027) (.025) (.022) (.018) (.017)
Difference 0.035 0.12∗∗∗
(.037) (.025)
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 6,880 4,241 5,132 16,862 9,821 12,593
Panel B: Thermometer Scores
Male 0.88∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ -0.15 1.92∗∗∗
(.28) (.24) (.25) (.22) (.18) (.20)
Difference 0.89∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
(.35) (.27)
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 11,439 6,551 8,709 20,192 11,795 14,428
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors
in parentheses. The N of the split-sample regressions do not sum to the N of the ideology
regression due to the fact that those respondents with the median ideology are included in both
regressions.
The results in Table 6 are broadly consistent with the patterns predicted by Proposition 2.
We find no statistical difference in average ideology between men and women before 1982, and
men are equally more ideologically extreme, regardless of their ideological direction. After
1982, men are significantly further to the right than women on average, and being male is
more correlated with extreme ideologies to the right than to the left. For the thermometer
scores, the difference in correlation between right and left expands as the ideological difference
18
between men and women increases.
This data is thus consistent with Proposition 2, and suggests that, for election years—the
only years that the ANES was conducted—after 1980, xt > 0, and was equal to zero for 1980
and before. This could be consistent with the patterns in the second panel of Table 5—there
seems to be a flattening of the relationship between ideology and age for those in late-middle
or old age—but the caveats about interpreting these results directly discussed in Section 6
still apply.17
8 The Importance of Non-Bayesian Behavior
Before turning to a comprehensive, integrated discussion of the results in this paper, we
provide one final analysis. Given the nuances of our theory necessary to explain the data,
it may be tempting to conclude that a simpler theory, perhaps a fully Bayesian one, could
account for our findings. However, the data in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) shows that,
at least in 2010, the variance of ideology is increasing in age. As this cannot be rationalized
by any fully Bayesian model, it is central to our argument for a more behavioral model, and
in particular the model extended here.
Given the centrality of the relationship between media exposure and extremeness in
falsifying fully Bayesian alternatives, it is thus useful to show that this relationship is not
just a flash in the pan. Figure 2 shows how the squared deviation of ideology evolves with
media exposure—how, in the language of this paper, Var[I|ni] changes with ni—in the
ANES data. As the finding of increasing variance is robust, we believe this argues strongly
for taking the approach we do, and working through the nuances imposed by the fact that
the world changes over time.
17One could also examine the relationship between age and ideology, and age and media exposure. However,
there is no variation in these relationships: older respondents are always more conservative, and the media
measure does not start until well after 1980. The former fact suggests that there is a natural tendency
for older citizens to be more conservative that is not accounted for in the theory. Doing so would call for
distinguishing this “natural” rate of movement to the right with slower and faster rates of becoming more
conservative in citizens as they age, and tying this to the variation in xt. We leave this for future research.
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Figure 2: Media Exposure and Ideological Extremeness
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9 Conclusion: Overconfidence and Ideology
The results in the previous sections suggest that there is no intrinsic relationship between
overconfidence and conservatism, yet, our theory is still consistent with the data we have
amassed. In particular, there is little doubt that conservatives were more overconfident
in 2010, the year of our previous study. Moreover, this is likely to have been the case in
election years since 1980. However, before 1980, and in non-election years (when surveys are
rarely run), conservatives and liberals appear to be equally overconfident. These results are
consistent with our (fully formalized) theory, and provide a deeper understanding of political
belief formation: it appears that these differences can be rationalized by the existence of
different political zeitgeists that shape people’s political beliefs over the course of their lives.
The difference between an election year, like 2010, and a non-election year, like 2011, is
a bit more difficult to understand. Unfortunately, there are very few political surveys run in
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non-election years, on the presumption that there is very little political news at that point
that citizens engage with. This may hold a clue to the results we see: as media will likely
not contain nearly as much salient political news, it will appear that x = 0 when considering
signals through media, but longer-standing political beliefs, like those acquired through the
experience of age, will persist. There is some evidence consistent with this in our data: the
standard deviation of ideology in 2010 is 1.07, while in 2011 it is a much lower 0.86. This
implies that in election years people may be more attuned to political ideology, perhaps
because of increased media coverage.18
One of the advantages of our approach is the fact that it relies on a well-specified math-
ematical theory, and, as such, can accumulate new insights into the formation of political
beliefs. Indeed, the main insights we incorporate here are not all that new. First, the
idea that different periods of history are dominated by different political ideas, or zeitgeists,
is well-known. Second, it is known that the prevailing political beliefs when one first be-
comes politically active are of outsized importance in determining one’s political orientation
(Meredith, 2009; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009). While these insights may not be
new, they have not been formalized, and by incorporating them into our theory about over-
confidence we are able to produce new tests of these combined theories. These tests produce
evidence consistent with the theory.19
An additional advantage of our correlational neglect model is that it can be embedded in
institutional models to determine how political behaviors affect outcomes. Indeed Levy and
Razin (2015) shows the benefit of doing so: they show that correlational neglect can lead to
18To the extent that both of the shifts above represent a change in the zeitgeist (the former likely does,
while further research will be necessary to confirm the latter), we can speculate about their causes. In 1980,
Ronald Reagan was elected President of the U.S. This so called “Reagan Revolution” lead certain parts of
the population to begin identifying as conservative, namely the “Reagan Democrats”. The shift in 2011 is
harder to speculate about, but it may be a result of the wild swings in public opinion—first towards the Tea
Party in 2010, then back to President Obama in 2012—that occurred in the wake of the financial crisis of
2008. It may also be due to the fact, as we suggest in the text, that political ideology is simply less important
in non-election years.
19As with our previous work, we are only describing correlations in the data. However, the fact that these
additional patterns are consistent with our theory increases the usefulness of it, as well as the chance that
we have identified an important causal mechanism. For more on causation and threats to identification, see
the conclusion of Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015).
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better information aggregation in elections.
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A Proofs
Proposition 4.
Define ei ≡ 1
tini
T∑
t=bi
ni∑
j=1
eijt. Then κ =
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρ , and κi =
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρi .
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that eijt = x+ ηt + εijt. As ηt⊥εijt, we have that citizen i
believes
Σei = Ση + Σεi =

1τη 0 · · · 0
0 1τη · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1τη

+

1 ρi · · · ρi
ρi 1 · · · ρi
...
...
. . .
...
ρi ρi · · · 1

where Σy is the covariance matrix of any random variable y, and 1 is an ni × ni matrix of
1s.
Thus, the posterior likelihood of citizen is beliefs is given by
L(x|ei) ∝ L(ei|x)L0(x)
∝ exp
{
−1
2
(x− ei)TΣ−1ei (x− ei)
}
exp
{
−1
2
x2τ
}
= exp

−1
2

x− ei11
x− ei21
...
x− einiti

T 
τη

1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1

+

1 ρi · · · ρi
ρi 1 · · · ρi
...
...
. . .
...
ρi ρi · · · 1


−1
x− ei11
x− ei21
...
x− einiti


∗ exp
{
−1
2
x2τ
}
= exp
{
−1
2
(
six
2 − 2x∑nij=1∑Tt=bi eijt
1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρi + C
)}
∗ exp
{
−1
2
x2τ
}
∝ exp
{
−1
2
si + τ(1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρi)
1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρi
(
x− siei
si + τ(1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρi)
)2}
where C is constant with respect to x, si = ti× ni, and from the definition in the statement
of the proposition, ei ≡ 1
si
ni∑
j=1
T∑
t=bi
eijt. Defining Di ≡ 1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρi, the posterior
belief of a citizen is distributed according to
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N
[
siei
si +Diτ
,
si +Diτ
Di
]
. (2)
Substituting si = Diκi the posterior is given by N
[
κiei
κi+τ
, κi + τ
]
, which is the same as the
posterior that a citizen would have if they received the single signal ei, where the citizen
believes ei ∼ N
[
x+
1
ti
T∑
t=bi
ηt, κi
]
. That is, κi = si/Di =
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρi , as desired.
Finally, note that E[ei] = x +
1
ti
T∑
t=bi
ηt, and defining Σ
(k,k′)
y as the (k, k′) element of the
covariance matrix of any random variable y
Var[ei] =
(
1
si
)2 si∑
k=1
si∑
k′=1
Σ(k,k
′)
ei
=
(
1
si
)2( si∑
k=1
si∑
k′=1
Σ(k,k
′)
η +
si∑
k=1
si∑
k′=1
Σ(k,k
′)
εi
)
=
(
1
si
)2(
tin
2
i τη + si + (s
2
i − si)ρ
)
=
1 + niτη + (si − 1)ρ
si
Thus, ei ∼ N
[
x+
1
ti
T∑
t=bi
ηt,
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρ
]
. Thus, the posterior precision of citizen
i should be
tini
1 + niτη + (tini − 1)ρ + τ = κ+ τ , as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider two citizens with κ1 > κ2. As E[Ei[I|κ]] = κxτ+κ , we
have that κ1x
τ+κ1
= κ2x
τ+κ2
⇐⇒ x = 0. Thus, I|κ ∼ N
[
0, τb(τ+κ)
2
τbκ2+(τ+κ)2
]
. As this is sym-
metric about zero for all κ, it implies Cov[E[E|κ, I ≥ 0], κ] = Cov[E[E|κ, I ≤ 0], κ] and
Var[I|I ≥ 0] = Var[I|I ≤ 0]. Finally, as this implies f(κ|I ≥ 0) = f(κ|I ≤ 0) = f(κ),
thus, Var[κ|I ≥ 0] = Var[κ|I ≤ 0]. Taken together this implies Corr[E , κ|I ≥ 0] =
Corr[E , κ|I ≤ 0]. 
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